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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Mothersell'
(decided April 1, 2010)
Robert Mothersell was convicted of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the fifth degree after officers recovered co-
caine during a search conducted pursuant to the issuance of an all-
persons-present warrant.2 At trial, Mothersell moved to suppress the
evidence recovered from his person alleging that the search and sei-
zure conducted violated his rights3 under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the New
York State Constitution.4  The trial court denied the motion to sup-
press and the decision was affirmed on appeal.5 Ultimately, the New
York Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of the lower courts,
granted the motion to suppress the evidence, and dismissed the in-
dictment.6
The trial court denied the motion to suppress on the basis of
the sole affidavit which an officer submitted in support of the warrant
application.' The affidavit described two controlled purchases of co-
caine, which known and reliable informants observed outside of the
subject premises.8 The affidavit described a purchase from a man
' 926 N.E.2d 1219 (N.Y. 2010).
2 Id. at 1221.
Id.
4 The United States Constitution and the New York State Constitution state:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
People v. Mothersell (Mothersell ll), 873 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2009).
6 Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d at 1226.
Id. at 1221-22.
8 Id. at 1221. The subject premises were "the first floor front apartment at 114 Isabella
Street, a two-story residential building." Id. The "two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test ... re-
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named "Tom" on February 2, 2006, and a second purchase from an
unknown male during the week of February 25, 2006. Relying on
these transactions, the court found that there "was probable cause es-
tablished to believe that the residence of 114 Isabella Street, First
Floor Front Apartment, was being used for the sale and distribution
of drugs . . . [and that] anyone present therein was involved in the
ongoing illegal activity."10 As a result, the court stated the affidavit
satisfied the standard for an all-persons-present warrant set forth in
People v. Nieves."
Additionally, due to an unresolved factual dispute, the trial
court conducted an independent hearing to determine whether the
search of the defendant constituted a mere strip search, as the People
claimed, or a more intrusive body cavity search, as the defendant
claimed.12  A detective who conducted the search testified at the
hearing, stating that he searched the defendant pursuant to the author-
ity he understood the warrant to convey.' 3 The detective participated
in "hundreds of all-persons-present warrants and [testified] that per-
sons were routinely strip-searched pursuant to such warrants and re-
quired to facilitate the examination of their anal and genital cavi-
quires a search warrant application to demonstrate the veracity or reliability of the source of
the information and the basis of the informant's knowledge." People v. Williams, 726
N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2001). See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
9 Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d at 1221.
10 Id
" 330 N.E.2d 26, 34 (N.Y. 1975) (stating that all-persons-present warrants may be issued
if "the facts before the issuing Judge at the time of the warrant application, and reasonable
inferences from those facts, . . . establish probable cause to believe that the premises are con-
fined to ongoing illegal activity and that every person within the orbit of the search possesses
the articles sought").
12 Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d at 1222. See People v. Hall, 886 N.E.2d 162, 164-65 (N.Y.
2008).
There are three distinct and increasingly intrusive types of bodily exami-
nations undertaken by law enforcement . .. [a] "strip search" requires the
arrestee to disrobe so that a police officer can visually inspect the per-
son's body. The second type of examination-a "visual body cavity in-
spection"-occurs when a police officer looks at the arrestee's anal or ge-
nital cavities, usually by asking the arrestee to bend over; however, the
officer does not touch the arrestee's body cavity. In contrast, a "manual
body cavity search" includes some degree of touching or probing of a
body cavity that causes a physical intrusion beyond the body's surface.
Id.
13 Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d at 1222.
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ties."1 4 At the time the warrant was executed, six or seven individu-
als were present in the apartment and were subjected to a search."
The detective and another officer conducted the search of the defen-
dant in a bedroom with no one else present.16 During the search, the
defendant "was required to lift his scrotum and then to bend over to
expose his anal cavity. The incriminating evidence was discovered in
the course of the latter exercise.""
Mothersell also testified on his own behalf at the hearing.
Mothersell testified that when he heard the officers enter the apart-
ment, and a gunshot fired, he hid in the bedroom and pretended to
sleep.' 9 When the officers entered the bedroom, the defendant was
thrown onto the floor and "[h]is hands were bound behind his back
with plastic." 20 Twenty minutes later, the officers returned, removed
the plastic fastening, and began the search.2' Mothersell complied
with the officers' requests to "remove his clothing and to lift his ge-
nitals," and the officers then "commanded [him] to turn around and
spread his cheeks." 22 Mothersell alleged the officers then grabbed
his arm and moved him into a position he could not escape from.23
Mothersell observed one officer grab a coat hanger off the bed and
the "officer [then] ran the coat hanger down between the cheeks of
his buttocks until a plastic bag fell onto the floor." 24 Notably, the de-
tective who testified at the hearing was not questioned about whether
he used a coat hanger to remove the contraband from Mothersell's
person. 25 However, two months after the hearing the officer remem-
bered that he used to coat hanger to remove the drugs.26
The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence,
14 id.
15 Respondent's Brief, Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d 1219 (No. 2010-0043), 2009 WL 6065729,
at *4.
16 id.
17 Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d at 1222.






23 Brief for Appellant, supra note 18.
24 id
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stating that although the search at issue constituted more than a mere
strip search-it involved a more intrusive visual body cavity
search-the all-persons-present warrant authorized the search and the
search was reasonable.27 On appeal, the defendant contended that the
court lacked sufficient evidence for the issuance of an all-persons-
present warrant and, in the alternative, that even if the court properly
issued the warrant, the warrant failed to authorize the body cavity
search the officers performed.28 The appellate division affirmed the
decision of the trial court, stating that "the warrant application estab-
lished probable cause to believe that the apartment was being used
for the sale of controlled substances and that anyone present was in-
volved in the ongoing illegal activity." 29 The New York Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the all-persons-present warrant lacked
validity and that the "extraordinary intrusions could not have been
within any authority the warrant was capable of conferring."30 Thus,
the court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine and
dismissed the indictment.31
In making its determination, the court relied heavily on the
decision in Nieves, which upheld the constitutionality of all-persons-
present warrants in the state of New York as well as delineated a
standard for the issuance of all-person-present warrants.32 Relying
on Nieves, the court determined that the all-persons-present warrant
at issue failed to meet the requisite standard.33 The warrant described
only two isolated purchases of the controlled substance which the
court stated "cannot suffice to show that a residential location has
been given over entirely to the drug trade, much less that every per-
son at the location is probably a participant in drug trafficking."34
Further, the warrant application failed to state whether "any innocent
use of the premises had been observed" or provide any information
regarding the behavior of persons normally present at the time pro-
posed for execution of the warrant.3 ' The court further recognized
27 Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d at 1222.
28 Id at 1221.
29 Id. at 1222 (quoting Mothersell II, 873 N.Y.S.2d at 407).
30 Id. at 1226.
32 Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d at 1223.
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that "the only statement . . . purporting to justify the issuance of an
all-persons-present warrant [was] the one in which the deponent[,]
[the officer who applied for the issuance of a warrant,] offer[ed] on
the basis of her past experience that it is 'not uncommon that persons
found in the subject residence could reasonably be expected to con-
ceal cocaine.' "36 Under Nieves, the application for an all-persons-
present warrant "requires a showing of facts from which it can be in-
ferred that it is substantially probable that any persons present at the
warrant's execution will have the sought evidence of the crime upon
them." 37  Therefore, the court held the all-persons present warrant
invalid."
Although the court's determination of the warrant's invalidity
alone compelled suppression of the evidence, the court decided to
address the defendant's second contention, which stated that even if
the court found the all-persons-present warrant valid, the warrant
failed to authorize the officers to conduct a strip search of the defen-
dant.39 The court relied on prior precedent in which it held that:
[A] post-arrest strip search must be based upon rea-
sonable suspicion that an arrestee is hiding contraband
beneath his or her clothing, and that a search involving
visual examination of an arrestee's anal and genital
cavities-a distinctly elevated level of intrusion, which
must be separately justified-may not be performed ex-
cept upon a "specific, articulable factual basis support-
ing a reasonable suspicion to believe the arrestee se-
creted evidence inside a body cavity." 4 0
36 Id.
3 Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d at 1225.
38 Id. "Our conclusion that this all-persons-present warrant is not valid should not be tak-
en as signifying a departure from Nieves's initial holding that warrants of this sort are not
categorically unconstitutional." Id
All-persons-present warrants for drug searches have been approved
where the supporting affidavits supply more detailed information regard-
ing the experience and training of the officer seeking the warrant, includ-
ing that, in the officer's experience, persons engaged in the sale of drugs
often work in concert with others and that those engaged in such activi-
ties frequently maintain residences separate and apart from the location
where the drug-related activity is conducted.
Id. at 1227 (Read, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 1225 (majority opinion).
40 Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d at 1225 (quoting Hall, 886 N.E.2d at 168). See United States v.
2011] 52 1
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Thus, in order for the search to be considered valid, there must exist
"specific facts to support a reasonable suspicion that a particular per-
son has secreted contraband beneath his or her clothes or in a body
cavity.,41 While a warrant must be obtained in order to permit the
search of persons, it is also required to limit the scope of the officers
conducting the search because without such limitations, a warrant
would "afford plenary authority for the inspection of the most private
recesses of a person's anatomy." 4 2 The court concluded that "[s]uch
a predicate did not exist at the time that the present warrant was
sought and, accordingly, these extraordinary intrusions could not
have been within any authority the warrant was capable of confer-
ring." 43
The United States Supreme Court decided the validity of all-
persons-presents warrants in Ybarra v. Illinois.44  In Ybarra, the
Court addressed the constitutionality of an Illinois statute, similar to
New York's Criminal Procedure Law Statute,45 which authorized law
enforcement officers to "search any person found on premises being
searched pursuant to a search warrant, to protect themselves from at-
tack or to prevent the disposal or concealment of anything described
in the warrant." 4 6 The application for the warrant stated that an in-
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (stating that a court must make a reasonable suspicion de-
termination based on the particular circumstances of the case). In order to support a reason-
able suspicion, "officers [may] draw on their own experience and specialized training to
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them."
Id. See People v. Cantor, 324 N.E.2d 872, 877 (N.Y. 1975) ("Reasonable suspicion is the
quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man . .. to
believe criminal activity is at hand. To justify such an intrusion, the police officer must indi-
cate specific and articulable facts which, along with any logical deductions, reasonably
prompted that intrusion.") (citations omitted); see generally People v. McIntosh, 755 N.E.2d
329, 331 (N.Y. 2001) ("Although police officers have 'fairly broad authority' to approach
and pose questions, they may not do so on mere 'whim or caprice'; the request must be
based on 'an articulable reason not necessarily related to criminality.' " (quoting People v.
Holhman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 209 (N.Y. 1992))).
41 Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d at 1226.
42 id
43 id.
4 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
45 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.15(2) (McKinney 2010) ("A search warrant which directs
a search of a designated or described place, premises or vehicle, may also direct a search of
any person present thereat or therein.").
4 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 87 (footnote omitted). Compare N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 690.15(2) (McKinney 2010), with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/108-9 (West 2010) ("In
the execution of the warrant the person executing the same may reasonably detain to search
any person in the place at the time: (a) To protect himself from attack, or (b) To prevent the
522 [Vol. 27
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formant, known and reliable to the police, observed tin-foil packages
of heroin at Aurora Tap Tavern behind the bar and on the bartender's
person. 47 Pursuant to the application, the judge issued a warrant au-
thorizing police to search the tavern and the bartender for evidence
that may show possession of a controlled substance, namely heroin.48
The officers executed the warrant the same day, and upon en-
tering the tavern explained to all those present their purpose and
stated that they would conduct a standard search of each individual
present for weapons. 49  The officers patted down the defendant,
Ybarra, and felt something like "a cigarette pack with objects in it." 0
Once the officer patted down the rest of the customers, he returned to
Ybarra, conducted another pat down, and removed the cigarette pack
from Ybarra's pants pocket.5' The cigarette pack contained "six tin-
foil packets containing a brown powdery substance which later
turned out to be heroin." 52
Subsequently, the grand jury indicted Ybarra for the posses-
sion of heroin, a controlled substance.53 Ybarra filed a motion to
suppress the evidence the officer seized from his person.54 The trial
court denied the motion, stating that the officers appropriately con-
ducted the search pursuant to Illinois statute in order to "prevent the
disposal or concealment of [the] things particularly described in the
warrant."5 5 As a result, the court, without a jury, convicted the de-
fendant of possession of heroin. 56 On appeal, the appellate court af-
firmed the decision, stating that the statute authorized "the search of
persons found on premises described in a warrant only if there is
some showing of a connection with those premises, [and] that the po-
lice officer reasonably suspected . . . that the person searched would
destroy or conceal items described in the warrant."5 7 The Illinois Su-
disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles or things particularly described in the
warrant.").
47 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 87-88.
48 Id at 88.
49id
so Id.
s" Id at 89.
52 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 89.
54id
ss Id. at 89 (quoting 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/108-9 (b) (West 2010)).
56 Id
"7 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 89 (internal citations omitted).
2011] 523
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preme Court denied leave for appeal and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the warrant
issued by the Magistrate failed to "authorize the search of Ybarra or
of any other patron found on the premises," and therefore, the offic-
ers lacked sufficient probable cause to search Ybarra.59 The Court
stated that "a person's mere propinquity to others independently sus-
pected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to proba-
ble cause to search that person." 60 Thus, because the searching offic-
ers lacked the requisite probable cause to search Ybarra, "the
searches of Ybarra and the seizure of what was in his pocket contra-
vened the Fourth ... Amendment[]." 6' Therefore, the Court reversed
the judgment and remanded to the Appellate Court of Illinois for fur-
ther proceedings.62
In the dissent, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Rehnquist classified the majority's holding "as but a further
hindrance on the already difficult effort to police the narcotics traf-
fic." 6 The dissent recognized that because search warrants are "an
anticipatory authorization," requiring a warrant to name all persons
that the officers intend to search prior to execution of the warrant fru-
strates the purpose of a search, and therefore a warrant must allow
police officers "enough flexibility to react reasonably to whatever
situation confronts them when they enter the premises."" The dis-
sent would therefore hold that the limited search of Ybarra, under the
suspicions and inferences of the officers conducting the search, "was
reasonable . . . [and] [t]he justification for the intrusion was linked
closely to the terms of the search warrant."s6
s Id. at 90.
' Id. at n.2.
60 Id. at 91.
61 Id. at 96.
62 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 96.
63 Id. at 96-97 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 102. "An absolute bar to searching persons not named in the warrant would often
allow a person to frustrate the search simply by placing the contraband in his pocket." Id.
65 Id. at 109. The Court adopted the Terry v. Ohio test which provided "a flexible model
balancing the scope of the intrusion against its justification," stating that the test for reasona-
bleness involved a " 'balancing [of] the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which




Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/2
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The United States Supreme Court, in Bell v. Wolfish,66 ad-
dressed the constitutionality of a correctional facility policy which
required guards to inspect an inmate's body cavity as part of a strip-
search conducted after each visit with an individual from outside of
the facility. 67 Although the district court upheld the constitutionality
of the strip-search procedure, the court mandated a showing of prob-
able cause that the inmate was concealing contraband to justify a
more intrusive body cavity search. 8 The court of appeals affirmed,
stating that the "gross violation of personal privacy inherent in such a
search cannot be outweighed by the government's security interest in
maintaining a practice of so little actual utility."69 Although the Su-
preme Court admitted that such a "practice instinctively gives us the
most pause," the Court held that the practice did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because it believed the searches under the cir-
cumstances were not unreasonable.70
The Metropolitan Correctional Center ("MCC") was con-
structed in 1975 in order to house persons "who are being detained in
custody prior to trial for federal criminal offenses."n The facility
employed a practice of requiring a strip-search and a body cavity
search of each inmate after they had contact with individuals from
outside the correctional facility. 72 In defense of their procedure, offi-
cials argued that "visual cavity searches were necessary not only to
discover but also to deter the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and other
contraband into the institution."73 In analyzing whether this practice
was constitutional, the Court "balanc[ed] . . . the need for the particu-
lar search against the invasion of personal rights that the search en-
tails."74 In order to determine whether the search was reasonable un-
der the Fourth Amendment, the Court considered several factors,
including "the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which
it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in
6 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
67 Id. at 558.
68 Id.
69 Id. (quoting Wolfish v. Levy, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 1978)).
70 Id.
7' Bell, 441 U.S. at 524.
72 Id. at 558.
7 Id.
74 Id. at 559.
2011] 525
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which it is conducted.",7  Because the facility is "fraught with serious
security dangers" and smuggling is a common occurrence, which is
normally attempted by concealing items in body cavities, the Court
concluded that such searches were reasonable.76 Although these
searches invaded the privacy of inmates, the issue the Court faced
was "whether visual body-cavity inspections as contemplated by the
MCC rules can ever be conducted on less than probable cause."77
The Court concluded that they could and reversed the decision of the
lower courts.
Justice Powell dissented with respect to the Court's holding
regarding body cavity searches. 79 Justice Powell reasoned that be-
cause body cavity searches require a serious intrusion on one's priva-
cy, "some level of cause ... should be required to justify the anal and
genital searches."so Justice Marshall also dissented, stating that "the
body-cavity searches of MCC inmates represent one of the most
grievous offenses against personal dignity and common decency."s1
In Justice Marshall's view, a body cavity search, which "is so unne-
cessarily degrading," invokes a "compelling-necessity standard,"
which in his opinion could not be met in this case.82 Lastly, Justice
Stevens, with whom Justice Brennan joined, dissented, stating the
body cavity search was the least justifiable policy challenged.83 JUS-
tice Stevens stated: "[a]bsent probable cause to believe that a specific
individual detainee poses a special security risk, none of these prac-
tices would be considered necessary, or even arguably reasona-
ble . . ."84
76 Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
n Id. at 560.
78 id.
7 Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell con-
curred with the majority's decision except for the "discussion and holding with respect to
body-cavity searches." Id.
80 Bell, 441 U.S. at 563.
s1 Id. at 576-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that the Court in making
its determination overlooked critical facts. Id. at 577. Notably, inmates must wear "one-
piece jumpsuits with zippers in the front," that make it almost impossible to conceal items in
the vaginal or anal cavity without unzipping the jumpsuit. Id. Further, Justice Marshall
stated that all visits are monitored from a glass-enclosed room where officers would observe
such a disrobing procedure required in order to conceal the contraband. Id
82 Bell, 441 U.S. at 578.
83 Id. at 594 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
* Id. at 595.
[Vol. 27526
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Similarly, the United States Supreme Court, in United States
v. Montoya de Hernandez," addressed the reasonableness and scope
of a search conducted by customs officials at the Los Angeles Inter-
national Airport. The district court allowed the cocaine found in
Hernandez's alimentary canal to be admitted into evidence and Her-
nandez "was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distri-
bute ... and unlawful importation of cocaine."87 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence the customs offi-
cials possessed was insufficient to justify a sixteen-hour detention.
On review, the Supreme Court held that detaining an individual at the
border "beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection,
is justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the facts
surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the trav-
eler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal." 89 Applying
the reasonable suspicion standard, the Court recognized the need to
balance the privacy right of the individual and the promotion of legi-
timate governmental interests when making decisions on less than
probable cause. 90 Specifically, officials at the border must have a
" 'particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular per-
son' of alimentary canal smuggling." 91
In Montoya de Hernandez, customs officials detained Rosa
Elvira Montoya de Hernandez ("Hernandez") upon her arrival in the
United States from Bogota, Colombia. 92 Upon arrival, Hernandez
proceeded to the customs desk where Inspector Talamantes reviewed
her documents and observed that she made "at least eight recent trips
to either Miami or Los Angeles."9 Inspector Talamantes and anoth-
er official questioned Hernandez concerning herself and the purpose
of her trip.94 After further questioning, officials suspected that Her-
8 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
86 Id.
8 Id. at 536.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 541.
90 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540-41.
91 Id. at 541-42 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
92 Id. at 532.
9 Id. at 533.
94 Id. Hernandez communicated with the officials solely in Spanish, revealing that she
had no family or friends in the United States. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533. The
inspectors discovered five-thousand dollars in cash, which Hernandez stated she was travel-
ling to the United States with to purchase goods for her husband's store in Colombia. Id.
5272011]
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nandez "was a 'balloon swallower,' one who attempts to smuggle
narcotics into th[e] country hidden in her alimentary canal."
A female inspector conducted a "patdown and strip search" of
Hernandez which revealed no contraband. 96  However, during the
search, the inspector noticed a "firm fullness" in Hemandez's abdo-
men and that she "was wearing two pairs of elastic underpants with a
paper towel lining the crotch area." 97 The inspectors obtained Her-
nandez's consent to take an x-ray at a hospital; however, she with-
drew this consent when officials informed her she would have to be
handcuffed. 98 "The inspector then gave [Hernandez] the option of
returning to Colombia on the next available flight, agreeing to an x-
ray, or remaining in detention until she produced a monitored bowel
movement that would confirm or rebut the inspectors' suspicions." 99
At first, Hemandez chose to return to Colombia; however, the only
flight was on a Mexican airline, which had a layover in Mexico City,
and the airline refused to transport Hernandez without the proper vi-
sa.' 00 Thus, Hernandez was detained for almost sixteen hours, refus-
ing all offers of food and drink, and refused to use the toilet.'o' The
inspectors noted that Hemandez "exhibited symptoms of discomfort
consistent with 'heroic efforts to resist the usual calls of nature.' t02
Finally, the customs officials obtained a court order which "autho-
rized a rectal examination and involuntary x[-]ray."10 3 A rectal ex-
amination, conducted by a physician, revealed a balloon containing a
foreign substance.'0" Within the next four days, Hemandez passed a
total of eighty-eight balloons which contained five-hundred and
Suspiciously, Hernandez only had cold-weather clothing, one high-heeled pair of shoes, and
no hotel reservations. Id. at 533-34.
9 Id. at 534.
96 id
9 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 534.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 534-35.
'" Id. at 535.
101 Id. ("She was told that if she went to the toilet she would have to use a wastebasket in
the women's restroom, in order that female customs inspectors could inspect her stool for
balloons or capsules carrying narcotics.").
102 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 535 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Her-
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twenty-eight grams of cocaine.'os
The Court stated that "[t]he permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by 'balancing its intrusion on the in-
dividual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legi-
timate governmental interests.' "106 The Court concluded that the
Government's interest in protecting the border outweighed Hernan-
dez's interest in privacy.107
The leading case in New York State which delineated the
standard for all-persons-present warrants is People v. Nieves. 08 In
Nieves, the court convicted the defendant of attempted possession of
gambling records and the promotion of gambling.' 09 The defendant
"was charged and convicted on the basis of evidence seized from his
person pursuant to a search warrant authorizing the search of certain
premises, a named individual not the defendant, and any other per-
sons occupying said premises."11o The defendant moved to suppress
the evidence, arguing that the search warrant "did not meet the parti-
cularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and was in fact an
impermissible general warrant.""' The court denied the motion, the
appellate division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals re-
versed and set the conviction aside." 2
In Nieves, the detective in charge of the investigation, a six-
teen year veteran of the department who "made over two hundred ar-
'0 Id. at 536.
106 Id. at 537 (quoting United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983))
(citations omitted).
107 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540. The Court also addressed whether the deten-
tion of Hernandez was reasonably justified and concluded that although the "detention was
long, uncomfortable, indeed humiliating; . . . its length and its discomfort resulted solely
from the method by which she chose to smuggle illicit drugs into this country," and the de-
tention was therefore not unreasonably long. Id. at 544. Justices Brennan and Marshall
vehemently dissented, stating: "The nature and duration of the detention here may well have
been tolerable for spoiled meat or diseased animals, but not for human beings held on simple
suspicion of criminal activity." Id. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, according to the
dissent, although Hernandez had already "been stripped and searched and probed, the cus-
toms officers decided about halfway through her ordeal to repeat the process . . . ." Id. at
547.
'0 330 N.E.2d 26.
'9 Id. at 29.
10 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 Id. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (stating in pertinent part: "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause ... particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized").
112 Nieves, 330 N.E.2d at 29.
2011] 529
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rests in the illegal gambling area," obtained a search warrant which
allowed any officer of the county to search, during the daytime, "El
Parador Restaurant & Cocktail Lounge located at 1647 Fifth Avenue,
North Bayshore, New York ... the person of Elizar Vidal and any
other person occupying said premises.""'3  During the execution of
the warrant, the officers discovered Elizar Vidal, Florencio Riverra,
and the defendant on the premises. 114 The officers told the men to
empty their pockets and "[w]hen [the] defendant complied, policy
contraband was recovered from his possession," and the officers
placed him under arrest."' The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence claiming the search violated his constitutional rights.116
The court denied the motion, which the appellate division af-
firmed.117 On appeal, the defendant raised two issues: (1) that the
criminal procedure law which allows the issuance of all-persons-
present warrants "authorizes general searches in contravention of the
Fourth Amendment and should be struck down[;]" and (2) "that the
particular search of his person was unreasonable."" 8
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution and article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution,
a warrant must describe with particularity the person to be seized." 9
However, according to section 690.15(2) of the New York Criminal
Procedure Law, "[a] search warrant which directs a search of a desig-
nated or described place, premises or vehicle, may also direct a
search of any person present thereat or therein." 20  The court in
Nieves determined the constitutionality of this statute authorizing the
issuance of an all-persons-present warrant. 121
113 Id. ("The warrant was issued based upon Detective Smith's sworn warrant application
... based upon his personal knowledge and investigation and upon information supplied by
an undisclosed informant whose previously furnished information had led to arrests and con-
victions in the gambling field.").
I14 Id. at 30.
115 Id
116 id
"' Nieves, 330 N.E.2d at 30.
11 Id
119 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
120 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.15(2) (McKinney 2010).
121 Mothersell, 936 N.E.2d at 1223; Nieves, 330 N.E.2d at 33-34 ("[W]hile the instant case
provides an illustration of the potential overbreadth and indefiniteness of the description 'any
other person present,' if the statute's application is carefully circumscribed, . . . it need not
be struck down.") (citation omitted).
[Vol. 27530
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The court in Nieves created a two-pronged test which must be
satisfied in order for the court to issue an all-persons-present war-
rant.122 A court is required "to probe not only the specificity of the
defendant's description in th[e] warrant . . . , but also whether there
was probable cause to believe that the property described in the war-
rant would be found on the persons so described at the specified pre-
mises."l 23 Further, "the facts before the issuing Judge at the time of
the warrant application, and reasonable inferences from those facts,
must establish probable cause to believe that the premises are con-
fined to ongoing illegal activity and that every person within the orbit
of the search possesses the articles sought."l24  This, the court be-
lieved, would only authorize "invasions of privacy [that] will be justi-
fied by [the] discovery of the items sought from all persons present
when the warrant is executed," and if this probability does not exist,
"then each person subject to search must be identified in the warrant
and supporting papers by name or sufficient personal description."l 25
In People v. Hall,126 the court "consider[ed] whether it is con-
stitutionally permissible for police to subject a person arrested for a
drug sale to a visual body inspection followed by a body cavity
search without first obtaining a warrant." 2 7  The court held that an
officer can conduct a visual inspection only if the police officers
"have a factual basis supporting a reasonable suspicion that the arres-
122 Nieves, 330 N.E.2d at 31-32.
123 Id In the particular case, the court determined that the sufficiency of the warrant
would be determined by asking "whether there was probable cause to believe that each and
every occupant of the El Parador at any time of day possessed the policy slips and gambling
records sought under the warrant." Id at 32.
124 Id. at 34 (emphasis added). Further, the court delineated factors which the Magistrate
must look for in the warrant application. Id. These factors include:
[T]he character of the premises, for example, its location, size, the par-
ticular area to be searched, means of access, neighborhood, its public or
private character and any other relevant fact. It must specifically de-
scribe the nature of the illegal activity believed to be conducted at the lo-
cation, the number and behavior of persons observed to have been
present during the times of day or night when the warrant is sought to be
executed.
Nieves, 330 N.E.2d at 34.
125 Id. Ultimately, the court in Nieves suppressed the evidence seized from his person and
reversed the defendant's conviction, stating: "The warrant, because too general as to him,
afforded no justification for his search." Id. at 35.
126 886 N.E.2d 162 (N.Y. 2008), cert. denied, New York v. Hall, 129 S. Ct. 159 (2008).
127 Id. at 163.
53 12011]
15
Morales: Court of Appeals of New York: People v. Mothersell
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011
TOURO LAWREVIEW
tee has evidence concealed inside a body cavity and the search is
conducted in a reasonable manner."l 28 "If the visual inspection re-
veals the presence of a suspicious object, the police must obtain a
warrant authorizing the object's removal unless there are exigent cir-
cumstances." 29
In Hall, officers observed the defendant receive cash from an
individual, enter a bodega, and emerge with two small white objects
in his hands which he handed to the individuals waiting outside.130
The officers believed the two small objects were crack cocaine and
brought the defendant into police custody.' 3 ' At the police station,
the officer searched the defendant's clothing and found no drugs.132
However, after placing the defendant in a private detention cell, the
officers ordered the defendant to remove his clothing and the police
"observed a string or piece of plastic hanging out of the defendant's
rectum."13 3 The officers believed the defendant placed a package of
drugs into his body.'34 When ordered to remove the package, the de-
fendant refused and the officers "proceeded to hold [the] defendant
while. . . [one officer] pulled on the string and removed a plastic bag
that was found to contain crack cocaine."l 35
Based on this finding, "[the] [d]efendant was indicted for
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fifth
degrees." 3 6 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, claiming
that a body cavity search without a warrant violated his constitutional
rights.'3 ' The court granted the motion and dismissed the indict-
ment.13 8 However, on appeal the court reversed the decision, stating
that "the visual inspection of [the] defendant's body cavity was per-
missible because the police had reasonable suspicion to believe that
[the] defendant had narcotics hidden inside his body and that, once
the string was discovered, the police were allowed to immediately re-
128 id
129 Id. at 163-64.
Is Id. at 164.
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trieve the drugs without first obtaining a warrant." Ultimately, the
New York Court of Appeals granted the defendant's motion to sup-
press the evidence and dismissed the indictment.140
In reversing the ruling of the appellate division, the New York
Court of Appeals reasoned that the motion to suppress must be
granted based on constitutional precedent. 4 ' The court determined
that:
[A] strip search must be founded on a reasonable sus-
picion that the arrestee is concealing evidence under-
neath clothing and the search must be conducted in a
reasonable manner. . .. [F]or a visual cavity inspec-
tion, the police must have a specific, articulable fac-
tual basis supporting a reasonable suspicion to believe
the arrestee secreted evidence inside a body cavity and
the visual inspection must be conducted reasonably. If
an object is visually detected . . . a warrant [must] be
obtained before conducting a body cavity search un-
less an emergency situation exists. 42
139 Id. The court stated:
[F]actors that courts consider to determine reasonableness of strip
searches include "defendant's excessive nervousness, unusual conduct,
information showing pertinent criminal propensities, informant's tips,
loose-fitting or bulky clothing, an itinerary suggestive of wrongdoing,
incriminating matter discovered during a less intrusive search, lack of
employment, indications of drug addiction, information derived from
others arrested or searched contemporaneously, and evasive or contra-
dictory answers to questions."
Id. at 176 (Ciparick, J., concurring) (quoting People v. Kelley, 762 N.Y.S.2d 438, 440 (App.
Div. 3d Dep't 2003)).
140 Hall, 886 N.E.2d at 169-70 (majority opinion).
141 Id. at 168; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) ("That we today hold
that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body
under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial in-
trusions, or intrusions under other conditions."); People v. More, 764 N.E.2d 967, 969 (N.Y.
2002) ("[T]here must exist a 'clear indication' that desired evidence will be found. In the
absence of such an indication, the Fourth Amendment mandates that the police 'suffer the
risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.' ") (quoting
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770).
142 Hall, 886 N.E.2d at 168. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and
absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the
human body are concerned. The requirement that a warrant be obtained
is a requirement that inferences to support the search "be drawn by a
17
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Because there were no exigent circumstances at the time of the
search, once the object was visually detected, the police were re-
quired to obtain a warrant before conducting an intrusive body cavity
search and physically removing the object, and that failure to do so
violated the defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment.14 3
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution require offic-
ers to obtain a warrant which states with particularity the premises
and individuals sought to be searched. However, under New York's
Criminal Procedure Law, the particularity requirement is expanded to
include the search of all-persons-present at the premises intended to
be searched. In reaching its decision, the court in Mothersell fol-
lowed the state law in holding that the validity of an all-persons-
present warrant depended on whether the expanded scope of the war-
rant created a substantial probability that the authorized search would
justify the intrusion if the items sought were in fact discovered.
The court in Mothersell accurately followed the reasoning of
Ybarra, noting that a person's mere existence at a location set forth in
the warrant, where other individuals are involved in alleged criminal
activity, does not provide the requisite probable cause needed to
search the individual. However, the majority opinion in Ybarra
failed to consider the policy implications of a blanket denial of all-
persons-present warrants. In the dissent, however, the Justices re-
emphasize the importance of authorizing all-persons-present war-
rants. The dissent correctly noted that police officers must have flex-
ibility when executing a search warrant to draw reasonable inferences
based on their past experiences when determining how and when to
conduct such searches.
Further, as in Nieves, the court in Mothersell determined that
the search conducted by the officers failed to meet the requisite stan-
dard and, thus, the court declared the search invalid as a matter of
law. However, although the court in Nieves and Mothersell deemed
these particular searches unconstitutional, the New York Court of
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)); More, 764 N.E.2d at 970
("The absence of exigent circumstances dictates the conclusion that the body cavity search
here was unreasonable," and therefore without a warrant the search violated the defendant's
rights under the Fourth Amendment.).
143 Hall, 886 N.E.2d at 169.
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Appeals declined to strike down the statute itself as unconstitutional.
Mothersell leaves the holding in Nieves undisturbed, in that the New
York Court of Appeals leaves open the possibility that under some
circumstances-circumstances which the court provides no guidance
in determining-an all-persons-present warrant may be deemed valid
by the court. However, a major criticism of the New York Court of
Appeals' decisions in Nieves and Mothersell is that the court provides
little guidance to the lower courts, who actually issue these warrants,
as to what type of circumstances and affidavits are in fact needed to
deem the issuance and authorization of an all-persons-present warrant
valid under our constitutional law.
While the court does not specifically delineate a particular set
of circumstances which would satisfy the standard for an all-persons-
present warrant, leaving open the possibility of conducting legal all-
persons-present searches supports the public policy argument that
such warrants ultimately curb and prevent the use of and trafficking
of controlled substances. This further supports the argument that re-
quiring police officers to obtain search warrants which name or de-
scribe with particularity each person who will be located at a particu-
lar premise prior to execution of the warrant would be burdensome,
unrealistic, and hinder the officers from both effectively enforcing the
law and promoting sound public policy. However, without particular
guidance as to what may be valid, an officer and the issuing Magi-
strate are currently playing a guessing game. Understanding that the
circumstances of Nieves and Mothersell failed to authorize the all-
person-present warrant, officers and issuing Magistrates must look
for something more; however, it is unclear what this something more
entails.
Without proper guidance from either the United States Su-
preme Court or the New York Court of Appeals as to what circums-
tances would permit the authorization and execution of an all-
persons-present warrant, the New York courts will continue to follow
the precedents set in Nieves and Mothersell and determine that the
warrants violate the defendant's constitutional rights. Additionally,
the courts will continually leave until another day the determination
of whether the statute authorizing the issuance of all-persons-present
warrants is constitutional. When making this determination, the court
should be weary of the policy implications of the all-persons-present
warrant and the possibility of abuse. Until these issues are resolved,
2011] 535
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the courts will continue to struggle with the constitutionality of the
all-person-present warrant.
Additionally, the court in Mothersell struggled with determin-
ing the proper scope of searches permitted under an all-persons-
present warrant. When a mere strip search is elevated to the level of
a more intrusive body cavity search, protections must be in place to
defend the intimate privacy interest that individual's possess in their
persons. Using the factors that the majority in Bell delineated to bal-
ance the need of the search against the invasion of privacy rights, the
search in Mothersell was appropriately deemed unreasonable under
the circumstances.
First, the scope of the intrusion went beyond the measures ne-
cessary to ensure the safety of the officers on the scene. Second, the
manner in which the search was conducted in Mothersell also proved
unreasonable - the use of a coat hanger to extract the evidence from
the defendant's anal cavity was unnecessarily degrading. Lastly, al-
though the officers conducted the search in a room with no other in-
dividuals present, it was unreasonable for officers to handcuff the de-
fendant with plastic and return to the room to conduct a body cavity
search, because this was above and beyond what was necessary to en-
sure their safety. Thus, it seems clear that under this standard, the
search of the defendant was correctly deemed unreasonable and a vi-
olation of the Fourth Amendment. Further, the court properly con-
cluded that an all-persons-present warrant lacked sufficient cause to
show that a specific individual, namely the defendant, posed a special
risk and therefore the extent to which the search invaded Mothersell's
privacy was neither necessary nor reasonable.
Mothersell accurately departed from the precedent set forth in
Montoya de Hernandez, which required a balancing of the legitimate
governmental interest with the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interest. The Court concluded that the governmental in-
terest outweighed the defendant's interest of privacy. The over-
whelming governmental interest in protecting the United States' bor-
der required officers to retain wide discretion when conducting
searches of suspected drug smugglers. Distinguishing the need for
wide discretion at the border, the court in Mothersell appropriately
concluded that the officers failed to show such an overwhelming
government interest which sufficiently supported the intrusion of Mo-
thersell's person. Moreover, before conducting the body cavity
536 [Vol. 27
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search of the defendant in Montoya de Hernandez, the customs offi-
cials obtained a court order which authorized an x-ray and rectal ex-
amination. The court in Mothersell correctly followed precedent
which required officers to obtain a warrant before conducting a more
intrusive search.
The court in Mothersell also accurately followed the
precedent set forth in Hall. While officers may have been reasonable
to conduct a visual inspection of Mothersell, from the evidence at tri-
al it appeared that the officers had no factual basis for believing that
he concealed evidence inside his body cavity. Thus, in the absence of
exigent circumstances, after officers visually examined Mothersell,
the police were required to obtain a warrant which authorized the
body cavity search and removal of any items from his anal cavity.
It seems clear from the evidence that once the officers tied
Mothersell's hands behind his back, he could not physically conceal
any contraband he may have possessed. For this reason, it seems
highly unlikely that after conducting a strip search, arguably founded
on a reasonable suspicion, the officers had a specific factual basis to
believe that Mothersell secreted evidence inside his body cavity,
which would warrant a visual inspection. Assuming, however, that
the officers satisfied this specific factual basis burden, under Hall if
an object is visually detected a warrant must be obtained before con-
ducting a body cavity search and extracting the evidence. Clearly,
the officers in Mothersell failed to obtain a warrant. Thus, the body
cavity examination, and the further extraction of the evidence with a
coat hanger, constituted an unwarranted physical intrusion and vi-
olated the defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment.
It is clear from the precedent set forth above that the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 12
of the New York State Constitution require officers to meet a stricter
standard in order to lawfully expand the scope of searches conducted
pursuant to a warrant. Providing officers with too much discretion in
this area will lead to injustices such as those that occurred in Bell,
Hall, and Mothersell. While an officer is provided some leeway to
conduct searches when there are exigent circumstances, in all other
instances a neutral Magistrate must grant permission for the expan-
sion of a searches scope. Without following this process, officers
may, within the confines of the law, begin eroding the protections
2011] 537
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granted to individuals under the search and seizure provisions.
Lauren L. Morales
. J.D. Candidate 2012, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.S. 2008, Boston
College. I would like to thank my family for their unconditional love and support. Addi-
tionally, I would like to thank the entire Law Review Staff, especially Dan Evers, for the
countless hours spent helping me restructure and edit this article.
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/2
